The trial of 
Kenya’s deputy president, William Ruto, and his co-defendant, the radio broadcaster Joshua arap Sang, is scheduled to begin at the 
International Criminal Court (ICC) on September 10, 2013. A three-judge trial chamber sitting in The Hague will hear the case.
The men face 
crimes against humanity charges
 for their alleged roles in murders, deportation or forcible transfer of
 population, and persecution during Kenya’s 2007-2008 post-election 
violence. Ruto, who was a member of parliament at the time, will be the 
first senior Kenyan politician to stand trial for crimes committed 
during the violence.
“Kenya’s leaders broke their promises to hold national trials, which 
obliged the ICC to step in as a court of last resort,” said 
Elizabeth Evenson,
 senior international justice counsel at Human Rights Watch. “As the 
trial begins, we should focus on the crimes committed more than five 
years ago and Kenya’s failure to afford justice to the victims who lost 
so much.”
The trial of Kenya’s president, Uhuru Kenyatta, in a related but 
separate case, is due to start at the ICC in November. Ruto and Kenyatta
 were on opposite sides of the political divide in 2007-2008 and are 
accused of organizing attacks against one another’s supporters. They 
were elected in March 2013 on a joint ticket.
The 2007-2008 violence followed what was widely perceived as a rigged
 presidential election. At least 1,100 people were killed and as many as
 650,000 people forced from their homes. Thousands were injured. The 
scope of sexual violence committed at the time is still not fully known.
 
The ICC stepped in to investigate in 2010 after Kenya’s then-leaders broke repeated promises to hold those responsible to account in national trials.
Ruto, Kenyatta, and Sang are not subject to arrest warrants, having 
cooperated with the court until now, and have pledged to continue 
voluntarily appearing before the ICC. The Kenyatta government has 
repeatedly tried, since taking office in April, to seek the support of 
regional leaders and political bodies – including the United Nations 
Security Council and the African Union – to end the ICC’s cases. This 
undermines its stated commitment to the court.
For additional information about the Kenya cases, please see "
Kenya: Q&A on Recent Developments on the International Criminal Court" (April 2013), “
Kenya: Q&A on Pre-Trial Hearing in Second ICC Case” (September 2011), “
Kenya: Q&A on Pre-Trial Hearing in First ICC Case” (August 2011), “
ICC: First Appearance of Kenya Suspects” (April 2011), and “
Kenya: Q&A on Kenya and the International Criminal Court” (January 2011).
1.What is the case against Ruto and Sang about? What crimes are they charged with?
2. What is the case against Kenyatta about? What crimes have been charged against him?
3. Why aren’t any of the accused facing arrest warrants?
4. Will Ruto be required to attend the trial in person?
5. What did Human Rights Watch’s research show about the Kenyan post-election violence?
6. Will Kenyan victims be able to participate in the trial?
7. Why did the ICC get involved in Kenya?
8.
 Apart from the ICC process, have victims and their families had access 
to justice in Kenya for crimes committed during the post-election 
violence?
9.
 Does the fact that the Kenyan people elected Kenyatta and Ruto as 
president and deputy president in March 2013 mean they don’t support the
 ICC process and it should end?
10.
 The 2013 elections in Kenya were held without violence, even though 
trials had yet to take place. Doesn’t this show that Kenyans have moved 
on?
11.
 At its May 2013 summit, the African Union called for the ICC’s cases to
 be handled by a “national mechanism” in Kenya. What impact does this 
have?
12. Some African heads of state charge the ICC with targeting African leaders for prosecution. Is this true?
13.
 The ICC prosecutor has alleged “unprecedented” levels of witness 
interference in the ICC’s cases. What can be done to ensure that 
witnesses are protected from interference or intimidation?
14. Has the ICC prosecutor effectively investigated the case against Ruto and Sang?
15. Are the ICC cases alone enough to bring accountability for the post-election violence?
	1.What is the case against Ruto and Sang about? What crimes are they charged with?
William Ruto and Joshua arap Sang are 
charged
 with the crimes against humanity of murder, forcible transfer of 
population or deportation, and persecution, stemming from their alleged 
involvement in an attack on perceived supporters of former President 
Mwai Kibaki’s Party of National Unity (PNU).
According to the 
International Criminal Court
 (ICC) prosecution, perpetrators destroyed houses and businesses 
identified as belonging to members of Kikuyu, Kamba, and Kisii ethnic 
groups thought to be PNU supporters, killing over two hundred people and
 injuring over a thousand more and forcing hundreds of thousands to 
flee. Five specific incidents occurring between late December 2007 and 
mid-January 2008 in 
Kenya’s Rift Valley form the basis for the charges.
The prosecutor contends that Ruto along with others, and supported by
 Sang, worked for up to a year before the election to create a network 
to carry out the plan, and that this network was activated when the 
election results in favor of Kibaki were announced. The goals of the 
plan, the prosecutor alleges, were to punish and expel from the Rift 
Valley people perceived to support the PNU, and to gain power in the 
province.
Ruto at the time was a member of parliament and a senior member of 
the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM), the party of Kibaki’s principal 
challenger, Raila Odinga. Sang was a radio host on the Eldoret-based 
Kass FM. The prosecutor will seek to prove at trial that Ruto created 
and supervised the network’s implementation of attacks, while Sang 
incited and then helped coordinate attacks by disseminating coded 
messages through his broadcasts.
The defendants are not required to set out their case in advance of 
trial. The Ruto defense has indicated that it intends to prove that 
prosecution witnesses colluded with one another and with the support of 
“international and domestic Kenyan organizations” to fabricate evidence.
The ICC prosecutor had initially sought charges against a third 
suspect in this case – Henry Kiprono Kosgey, then also a senior ODM 
member of parliament – but a 
pre-trial chamber found insufficient evidence to send the case against him to trial.
	2. What is the case against Kenyatta about? What crimes have been charged against him?
Uhuru Kenyatta is 
charged
 with committing the crimes against humanity of murder, forcible 
transfer of population or deportation, rape, other inhumane acts, and 
persecution. The prosecutor will seek to show that Kenyatta enlisted the
 Mungiki, a criminal gang, to carry out attacks on perceived ODM 
supporters in and around Nakuru and Naivasha towns during the last week 
of January 2008. During these attacks, allegedly organized in response 
to attacks on PNU supporters in other areas of the Rift Valley, the 
prosecutor alleges that Mungiki and other pro-PNU youth – some 
transported to the Rift Valley from other parts of Kenya – killed, 
raped, and injured (including through forced circumcision and penile 
amputation). They also allegedly looted and destroyed properties and 
displaced thousands of people.
	3. Why aren’t any of the accused facing arrest warrants?
All three defendants in the ICC’s Kenya cases are subject to voluntary summonses to appear.
These may be issued at the ICC in the place of arrest warrants, where
 the judges consider that a warrant is not necessary to ensure the 
person’s appearance before the court.
Like an arrest warrant, an ICC summons to appear contains the crimes 
an individual is alleged to have committed and triggers proceedings that
 may bring a case to trial. But unlike an arrest warrant, the summons 
imposes only an obligation on the individual to appear before the court 
in The Hague; a summons does not impose any obligation on the 
authorities in Kenya or any other ICC state party to arrest the person. 
If the accused fails to appear or does not comply with any conditions 
listed in a summons, the pre-trial chamber may decide to issue an arrest
 warrant. All the accused have complied with their summons to date.
	4. Will Ruto be required to attend the trial in person?
Yes, for the time being. In June 2013, 
the trial chamber
 excused Ruto from personally appearing before the court for 
considerable potions of the trial. The trial chamber by a 2-1 majority 
found that although ICC defendants have a duty to appear in person, the 
need to accommodate Ruto’s responsibilities as deputy Kenyan president 
justified an exception to this rule. The chamber required Ruto to attend
 certain hearings including the trial’s opening, closing, if victims 
present their views in person, and the delivery of the judgment.
The decision is not final, however. The trial chamber, by a different majority, 
granted the prosecution leave to appeal and a decision is still pending from the ICC’s appeals chamber. The appeals chamber 
decided in August 2013 that Ruto will be required to attend all sessions of the trial until it renders a final decision on the appeal.
	5. What did Human Rights Watch’s research show about the Kenyan post-election violence?
In January and February 2008, Human Rights Watch researchers were on 
the ground documenting the post-election violence as it unfolded. Human 
Rights Watch conducted more than 200 interviews with victims, witnesses,
 perpetrators, police, magistrates, diplomats, Kenyan and international 
nongovernmental organization staff, journalists, lawyers, 
businesspeople, local government officials, and members of parliament 
across the country, from all major ethnic groups.
Human Rights Watch 
documented
 essentially three patterns of violence. First, members of the Kenyan 
police forces responded to demonstrations and riots with excessive force
 in some areas. They fired on unarmed demonstrators and bystanders to 
break up riots, and to keep people away from demonstrations. In other 
areas, the police did nothing as mobs committed acts of brutality. The 
Commission of Inquiry into Post-Election Violence (CIPEV), also known as
 the Waki Commission, 
found
 that of the more than 1,100 people killed during the violence, 405 were
 shot fatally by police. An additional 557 individuals were injured by 
police gunfire.
Second, mobilized opposition supporters – especially in the Rift 
Valley and the informal settlements of Nairobi – attacked those they 
assumed had voted for Kibaki and his PNU. The victims were predominantly
 Kikuyu, Kenya’s largest ethnic group, reflecting an ethnic dimension to
 the violence. Around Eldoret, local ODM mobilizers and other prominent 
individuals called meetings during the election campaign to urge 
violence in the event of a Kibaki victory. In the days that followed, 
attacks were often meticulously organized by local leaders.
Third, Kikuyu militia carried out reprisal attacks on members of 
ethnic groups seen to be associated with the ODM. In Naivasha and Nakuru
 in the southern Rift Valley, PNU mobilizers and local businesspeople 
called meetings, raised funds, and directed youth in their attacks on 
non-Kikuyus and their homes.
Human Rights Watch has consistently called for those behind the 
attacks to be held to account, and for investigations to determine the 
extent of links between the attackers and the national leaderships of 
the opposition and ruling parties. Human Rights Watch’s research 
suggested some leaders may have been at least aware of what was 
happening and done little to stop it. Some may have been more directly 
involved.
	6. Will Kenyan victims be able to participate in the trial?
Yes, although few, if any, will appear in person before the ICC.
Under an innovative system at the ICC, some victims may participate 
in the case against Ruto and Sang. These are individuals who suffered 
harm in the specific incidents underlying the charges in the case and 
they are participating in their own right, rather than exclusively as 
witnesses called by the prosecution or defense. The victims in the case 
have a court-appointed lawyer, Wilfred Nderitu, a member of the Kenyan 
bar, serving as their common legal representative and supported by staff
 of the ICC’s Office of Public Counsel for Victims.
According to a decision of the trial chamber, apart from key moments 
in the trial like the opening statements, staff of the Office of Public 
Counsel for Victims will appear in court on behalf of Nderitu. On behalf
 of his clients, he may seek permission to question witnesses and 
introduce evidence. At the request of a victim, via the common legal 
representative, the judges may also give a victim permission to present 
his or her views directly to the court, either in person or via 
video-link.
The court said 327 victims participated in proceedings before the 
pre-trial chamber. The trial chamber ordered a new system to register 
victims so they are not required to submit individual applications, as 
has been the practice of other trial chambers. It is uncertain how many 
victims will participate in the trial. In June 2013, a letter was sent 
to the court, purportedly on behalf of 93 victims, seeking to withdraw 
their participation in light of a loss of confidence in the process. The
 circumstances under which the letter was sent have not been publicly 
verified.
	7. Why did the ICC get involved in Kenya?
Kenya joined the ICC in 2005. The ICC is a court of last resort, 
stepping in only where national authorities are unable or unwilling to 
genuinely prosecute crimes within the court’s jurisdiction. It was on 
the basis of inaction by the Kenyan authorities to hold those 
responsible that the ICC opened cases in Kenya.
In 2008, mediators appointed by the African Union, called the Panel 
of Eminent African Personalities and led by former UN Secretary-General 
Kofi Annan, helped negotiate an end to the violence. An agreement by the
 parties put in place the Commission of Inquiry into Post-Election 
Violence or Waki Commission. The commission found that serious crimes 
had taken place and recommended establishment of a special tribunal in 
Kenya to hold those most responsible to account in national trials. Its 
report
 contained a strict timeline for setting up the tribunal and putting it 
to work, which, if breached, would require the mediator – Kofi Annan – 
to pass a sealed envelope with the names of chief suspects to the 
International Criminal Court.
In December 2008, Kibaki and Odinga, who became prime minister in the
 coalition government, agreed to establish a special tribunal to 
prosecute perpetrators of the post-election violence. Kibaki and Odinga,
 however, failed to follow through, and did not marshal necessary 
support in parliament for the tribunal. In what now seems a clear 
attempt to stall domestic justice efforts, Ruto, among other members of 
parliament, purported to support the ICC under the rallying cry “Don’t 
be vague! Let’s go to The Hague!” Legislative efforts to establish the 
tribunal went nowhere over the course of 2009.
In the absence of national steps toward accountability, and after 
Annan had handed over the envelope from the Waki Commission in July 
2009, the ICC prosecutor announced in November 2009 that he would seek 
authorization from the pre-trial chamber to open an investigation. In 
authorizing the prosecutor’s investigation in March 2010, the pre-trial 
chamber 
found
 that there were no relevant national proceedings regarding the types of
 offenses and high-level individuals likely to be targeted in the ICC 
investigation.
	8. Apart from the ICC process, have victims and their 
families had access to justice in Kenya for crimes committed during the 
post-election violence?
No. According to Human Rights Watch’s 
research,
 although tremendous pressure from the Kenyan population stirred initial
 efforts in the aftermath of the violence to bring accountability, 
slapdash investigations and prosecutions were so hurried that they 
resulted in acquittals.
Following initial failures, the criminal justice apparatus appeared 
to lose momentum. Out of thousands of potential cases, Human Rights 
Watch has confirmed only a handful of convictions for serious crimes 
related to the 2007-2008 post-election violence, and convictions in only
 three murder cases. This is in spite of the adoption of a new 
constitution in 2010 and reforms to the judiciary. The previous 
government did not show a serious commitment to ensuring fair, 
transparent and effective investigations of those who organized and 
financed the violence.
In 2012, the Kenyan Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) announced 
that his office would review at least 5,000 cases with a view to 
prosecuting them ahead of the 2013 elections, but a committee appointed 
to review the cases said in August 2012 that it was finding it difficult
 to obtain evidence in most cases. The DPP recently indicated that his 
office obtained an additional 54 convictions for crimes of sexual 
violence committed during the post-election violence.
Police officials implicated in crimes have enjoyed impunity, with an 
acquittal in one case of murder brought against a police officer. This 
was in spite of the fact that the police officer was caught in footage 
broadcast on national television shooting two protesters who appeared to
 be unarmed. Both protesters died.
In many police shooting cases, surviving victims or family members 
sought to file criminal complaints, but were turned away. The father of 
two children shot by police, one an 11-year-old girl, 
told Human Rights Watch:
I went to the police and said “The police 
killed my child.” They said, “The police don’t kill people.” They 
refused to write a statement. When I insisted, they said, “If you 
continue to play around, you could be shot, too.”
The government has refused to pay compensation in successful civil 
suits brought by victims of police shootings. Victims of police 
shootings and of sexual violence committed during the post-election 
violence have filed two constitutional cases in the Kenyan high court 
seeking to compel the government to address these crimes.
The failure to hold to account those responsible for the 2007-2008 
election violence continues a cycle of impunity in Kenya. Perpetrators 
of political violence in 1992 and 1997 also escaped justice. As a 
Kalenjin elder 
told a Human Rights Watch researcher:
We are very good at saying we don’t leave a 
single stone unturned, but we don’t turn a single stone. Maybe we turn 
pebbles….Small stones are turned. The big ones, no one dares.
	9. Does the fact that the Kenyan people elected 
Kenyatta and Ruto as president and deputy president in March 2013 mean 
they don’t support the ICC process and it should end?
The ICC treaty does not recognize immunity from prosecution for 
officials, and Kenya’s constitution expressly provides that the 
president is not immune from prosecution for crimes under a treaty to 
which the country is a party, and which, like the Rome Statute, 
prohibits such immunity. Cases have been brought in international 
tribunals against sitting heads of state, including Omar al-Bashir of 
Sudan, Charles Taylor of Liberia, and Slobodan Milosevic of the former 
Yugoslavia.
Kenyatta and Ruto campaigned on pledges to continue their cooperation
 with the ICC, and both restated this pledge following their election. 
At the same time, however, their campaign rhetoric sought to paint the 
ICC as a tool of Western imperialism. Since taking office the Kenyatta 
government has actively courted the support of other African leaders to 
undermine the ICC (see below). It has also ignored threats against human
 rights defenders and journalists that seem linked to their perceived 
association with the ICC
In this context it is unsurprising that views about the ICC process 
have become increasingly polarized among Kenyans. According to a media 
report, an unpublished June 2013 poll by South Consulting showed 
significant continued support for the ICC process – 50 percent of 
respondents – but this marks a drop from the highest reported level of 
support in the same poll of 89 percent in June 2011. Another June 2013 
survey shows that support for the ICC has dropped even further in Kenya 
to 39 percent, the first time that this poll, conducted regularly by 
Ipsos Synovate since October 2010, has recorded support below 50 
percent. The ICC process itself has suffered setbacks like the 
withdrawal of the willingness of some witnesses to testify, including 
those who have cited security concerns (see below), which may have 
undermined confidence.
Serious crimes were committed in 2007-2008 and, in the vast majority 
of cases, those responsible have yet to be held to account. The ICC, 
while imperfect, is providing a measure of access to justice denied in 
Kenya.
	10. The 2013 elections in Kenya were held without 
violence, even though trials had yet to take place. Doesn’t this show 
that Kenyans have moved on?
While the 2013 elections were not marked by the scale of violence 
witnessed in 2007-2008, they were preceded by inter-communal clashes in 
parts of Kenya which claimed more than 477 lives and displaced another 
118,000 people before the vote. Human Rights Watch research 
demonstrates
 that the underlying causes of the 2007-2008 post-election violence in 
the Rift Valley largely remain unaddressed, in spite of pressure from 
authorities in some areas to “move on”.
Victims of the 2007-2008 violence told Human Rights Watch that an 
absence of justice had contributed to tensions before the 2013 
elections. One Kikuyu elder 
said:
I see people who killed my relatives, raped my
 cousin, destroyed my property. They have not been arrested and tried. 
They have not apologized for what they did. How do you expect me to just
 accept that and move on? 
Kenya’s impunity crisis is profound. Those responsible for political 
assassinations under President Jomo Kenyatta’s post-independence regime,
 and for the use of torture against political opponents and excessive 
use of force by the security services under President Daniel arap Moi, 
were not prosecuted. The 2007-2008 election violence was preceded by 
similar episodes around the 1992 and 1997 elections. Government 
commissions named names, including prominent politicians, but no one was
 prosecuted. This entrenched impunity likely encouraged politicians to 
believe in 2007 that they could get away with virtually anything to 
achieve their political ends.
Civil society activists interviewed by Human Rights Watch in 2011 
could not recall a single case in which a senior politician had been 
convicted of a serious crime in Kenya, despite an endless stream of 
allegations of criminal behavior.
Justice is an important right and end in and of itself, but Kenya’s 
history suggests that the failure to deal head-on with past crimes may 
only encourage future violence.
	11. At its May 2013 summit, the African Union called 
for the ICC’s cases to be handled by a “national mechanism” in Kenya. 
What impact does this have?
No legal impact. The African Union (AU), a regional body, does not 
have standing to challenge the ICC’s jurisdiction in favor of domestic 
proceedings once an ICC investigation is open. Under Article 19 of the 
Rome Statute, only the accused, a state that has jurisdiction over the 
case, or a state that must consent to the court’s jurisdiction, may 
submit such an “admissibility challenge”. In light of Kenya’s track 
record on accountability, the AU’s call lacks credibility. Kenya lost an
 admissibility challenge before the ICC in 2011, when judges could find 
no evidence that Kenyan authorities were actually investigating any of 
the six individuals then named in the ICC’s cases.
The Kenyan government has sought to 
keep up the appearance of cooperation
 with the ICC despite the prosecutor’s allegations that cooperation has 
been slow or lacking. But the AU’s call resulted in part from concerted 
advocacy on the part of Kenyatta’s government to use political bodies to
 undermine the ICC’s cases. In the run-up to the AU summit, the Kenyan 
government had also called on the United Nations (UN) Security Council 
to “terminate” the ICC cases, a power the ICC treaty does not give to 
the council. Since the summit, the Kenyan government has asked ICC 
member countries, which meet annually, to convene a special session to 
consider the AU’s call. This request has been turned down.
The ICC depends on the public support of its member countries and 
other interested parties to create a climate conducive to its work. 
These initiatives by Kenyan government officials appear to be designed 
to have the opposite effect. Other ICC member countries should step up 
their efforts to insist on Kenya’s full cooperation – in spirit and in 
letter – with the court.
	12. Some African heads of state charge the ICC with targeting African leaders for prosecution. Is this true?
In the context of the May 2013 African Union summit, several African 
leaders made public criticisms of the ICC for targeting Africans. Some 
African leaders have previously made the claim that the ICC is targeting
 Africa, but the extent of comments around this summit reflects a 
qualitative increase, especially among leaders of ICC states parties. 
This is likely at least partly attributable to Kenya’s significance in 
Africa and to “shuttle diplomacy” by Kenyan leaders to secure support at
 the summit.
While claims that the ICC is targeting African leaders have found 
traction, they are not factual. The ICC’s cases are all from Africa, but
 the majority came before the ICC as a result of requests by the African
 governments of countries where the crimes were committed (Uganda, 
Democratic Republic of Congo, Central African Republic, Cote d’Ivoire, 
and Mali). Two other situations – Libya and Darfur, Sudan – were 
referred by the UN Security Council to the ICC, consistent with the 
council’s authority to make referrals under article 13 of the Rome 
Statute. Only with regard to Kenya did the ICC prosecution act entirely 
on its own initiative, and, as discussed above, only after Kenya failed 
to take action on justice at home and Annan had handed over the sealed 
envelope from the Waki Commission.
Although claims that the ICC is targeting Africa are inaccurate, 
double standards are certainly at work in the operation of international
 justice. Governments are able to shield their citizens and the citizens
 of their allies from the ICC’s authority by not joining the ICC or by 
using their veto power at the UN Security Council to block referrals of 
situations to the ICC. It is essential that those supportive of justice 
for serious crimes, including ICC member countries, work to press for 
accountability regardless of where crimes are committed and call out 
double standards when states seek to block access to justice.
	13. The ICC prosecutor has alleged “unprecedented” 
levels of witness interference in the ICC’s cases. What can be done to 
ensure that witnesses are protected from interference or intimidation?
The ICC prosecutor has characterized the scale of interference with 
witnesses in the Kenya cases as “unprecedented,” referring to pressure 
on witnesses and their families. Victims participating in the ICC cases 
in Kenya have consistently highlighted their safety concerns in court 
through their legal representatives. In the two Kenya cases, publicly 
available court records suggest that some potential prosecution 
witnesses have either not confirmed their willingness to testify or have
 withdrawn their testimony citing security concerns.
The ability of all witnesses – whether for the prosecution or the 
defense – to appear before the court securely and without fear of 
reprisal is essential to fair and credible trials. The same is true with
 regard to the effective exercise of the rights of victims to 
participate in ICC proceedings. Interfering with witnesses can amount to
 a crime leading to prosecution under both the ICC treaty and Kenyan 
law.
The ICC has an obligation to take appropriate measures to protect the
 well-being and safety of witnesses, victims participating in the 
proceedings, and others at risk on account of testimony given by 
witnesses, including, for example, so-called intermediaries assisting 
the work of the court. Protective measures may range from steps like 
permitting witnesses to testify in a closed session to keep their 
identities hidden from the public to relocating witnesses away from 
security threats. Protective measures can be taken for both prosecution 
and defense witnesses.
Long delays in relocating ICC witnesses can expose them to risk and 
delay proceedings, given the need to ensure that protective measures are
 in place before witness identities are disclosed to other parties. ICC 
officials have repeatedly stressed the urgent need for additional 
countries to sign witness relocation agreements with the court. It is 
also critical that states respond positively to requests for assistance 
in relocation in order to meet protection needs. The ICC’s new 
registrar, elected in March, has indicated that the protection, support,
 and relocation of witnesses will be among his first priorities.
While the ICC has specific obligations for its witnesses, victims, 
and intermediaries, the Kenyan government has the primary responsibility
 to protect the safety of all those within its borders. This includes 
investigating harassment or threats amounting to violations of national 
law. Kenya’s government should make a public commitment to take steps to
 help ensure the security of those assisting justice processes and to 
continue strengthening its national Witness Protection Agency.
	14. Has the ICC prosecutor effectively investigated the case against Ruto and Sang?
It will be up to the judges to determine on the basis of the full 
record before them whether the prosecutor brings forward sufficient 
evidence to prove Ruto and Sang each guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. 
The defendants are entitled to the presumption of innocence and full 
protection of their fair trial rights. The Ruto defense has indicated 
that it intends to prove that prosecution witnesses colluded with one 
another and with the support of “international and domestic Kenyan 
organizations” to fabricate evidence. Again, it will be up to the judges
 to weigh these claims.
More generally, investigations at the ICC face a number of 
challenges, including securing state cooperation, providing adequate 
protection to encourage witnesses to come forward, and collecting 
evidence linking the actions of high-level accused to crimes carried out
 by other people. Securing state cooperation and witness protection have
 been two acute challenges in the Kenyan cases.
Human Rights Watch has been concerned that the Office of the 
Prosecutor’s investigative methodologies may need strengthening to meet 
these challenges. There are clear signs that the prosecution is taking 
steps toward this end, including requesting additional resources from 
ICC states parties for investigations. Adapting the office’s 
investigative practices to the court’s operational challenges is no easy
 task, but it is essential to ensuring that the ICC can deliver 
effective and meaningful justice. Human Rights Watch continues to urge 
the prosecutor to identify any needed reforms and calls on states 
parties and other international partners to support the additional 
resources and cooperation – including in witness protection – which may 
be needed to improve the efficacy of the office’s investigations.
	15. Are the ICC cases alone enough to bring accountability for the post-election violence?
The ICC cases could make a key contribution to break Kenya’s cycle of
 impunity for political violence and to afford access to justice for 
some victims of the 2007-2008 violence. But given the limited number of 
cases the ICC prosecutor has brought in the Kenya situation, and that 
those cases relate to specific incidents, in specific locations, and on 
specific dates, there is a clear need to establish special judicial 
mechanisms in Kenya to investigate and prosecute additional cases in 
order to bring full accountability.
There is a pressing need, in particular, to address the role police 
may have played in the post-election violence. Although the ICC 
prosecutor had alleged that Kenyatta’s then co-defendants, the former 
head of public service Francis Muthaura and the former Kenyan police 
commissioner Mohammed Hussein Ali, had worked together to ensure that 
the Kenya police did not intervene to stop the attacks in Nakuru and 
Naivashatowns or to punish those who carried them out, an ICC pre-trial 
chamber did not find sufficient evidence that the police had 
participated in the attack. The case against Ali was dropped, and a year
 later, the ICC prosecutor 
dropped all charges against Muthaura.
 The prosecutor continues to allege in the Kenyatta case that police 
uniforms were distributed to the Mungiki; that the police were 
instructed not to interfere with the transportation of youth into the 
Rift Valley to carry out attacks; that the police at times refused to 
intervene or were slow to respond; and that the police later targeted 
and killed several Mungiki leaders who had knowledge of the involvement 
of Kenyatta or other politicians in the planning of the violence.
The ICC prosecutor also initially sought to include in the case 
against Kenyatta, Ali, and Muthaura charges related to police use of 
excessive force in Kisumu, a city in the former Nyanza province, and 
Kibera, an informal settlement in Nairobi. But an ICC pre-trial chamber 
found that the prosecutor had not brought forward sufficient evidence of
 a link between the three defendants and police actions. Human Rights 
Watch 
had urged
 the Office of the Prosecutor to continue its investigations of police 
violence, and, evidence permitting, to reintroduce relevant charges.
Kenya’s judicial system faces a number of challenges in taking up 
additional cases related to the post-election violence. In November 2012
 the Kenyan chief justice announced plans to establish an International 
Crimes Division in the Kenyan high court. The Kenyan government should 
ensure broad public consultation on the establishment of the 
International Crimes Division and on other measures that will be 
necessary to overcome the systematic weaknesses and blockages that have 
prevented effective prosecution of the post-election violence. In 
addition to judges with specialized expertise, this includes prosecutors
 and investigators properly trained and insulated from political 
interference and the strengthening of Kenya’s witness protection system.
Kenya Q&A on the ICC trial of Kenya's Deputy President